Why did Seris suddenly plummet?

Why did Seris suddenly plummet?

Dongzhen Shanglue · November 7, 2025, 10:13

The only way to restore market confidence is to prove to the world that it has the ability and

determination to expand its corporate boundaries to the core area that supports its independent value.

On November 5, 2025, Sailis Motors listed on the Hong Kong stock market as the "first domestic A+H luxury new energy vehicle company",

raising HKD 14 billion, becoming the largest IPO of a global car company in the Hong Kong stock market this year.

However, on the first day of listing, it encountered a "black opening."

The stock price opened low and fell by nearly 10% at one point, with a market value evaporating over HKD 20 billion.

Although the underwriters used "greenshoe funds" to protect the market and barely held the issue price, the stock price continued to fall the next day,

officially falling below the issue price.

The A-share market has also been dragged down, with a cumulative market value shrinking by about 6.7 billion yuan in two days.

Although the Hong Kong stock offering price is more than 22% discount to A shares, institutional investors are still not optimistic.

Only more than half of the shares originally planned for sale were sold, indicating a cautious attitude of large funds.

In stark contrast, retail investors subscribed to the market, with an oversubscription of 133 times and frozen funds exceeding 170 billion Hong Kong

dollars. However, the market believes that this is more of a short-term speculation, and it is difficult to sustain the stock price.

Cyrus's anchor is wrong

The "opening black" of Sailis is a manifestation of the "market effectiveness theory" in the mature institutional market of Hong Kong stocks.

The core contradiction lies in: There is an irreconcilable conflict between the company's valuation expectations based on past

"story" and the valuation model based on future "risk discount" by institutional investors.

You know,The IPO price is not set at will, it needs an "anchor" to gain market recognition.

Any company going public needs to set a price for its stock, which cannot be a castle in the air.

It must find an "anchor" that can convince the market.

For companies like Sailis, which are already listed on the A-share market, the most direct and seemingly reasonable anchor point

is its real-time stock price on the A-share market. The logic is simple: We already have a market-traded price in the A-share market,

and the Hong Kong stock issue price is based on this, giving a "friendship discount". Isn't this a concession to Hong Kong stock investors?

The misconceptions are hidden here.

The underwriters of the company offered a discount of 22.7% compared to the closing price of the A-share market,

which seems to be far higher than their peers, but they misjudged the market's judgment logic.

Professional institutional investors, especially those experienced international funds in the Hong Kong stock market,

do not care about "how much cheaper you are than A-shares." They only care about one question:

"How much are you worth more than your intrinsic value?"

The "intrinsic value" here is a calculation based on the company's future cash flow discount, profitability, growth potential, and risk assessment.

The problem is that the A-share stock price of Seris itself may be a bubble that has been blown up under the multiple support of liquidity,

retail investor enthusiasm, and the "Huawei concept".

Using a price that may have a bubble as a benchmark and then discounting it,

the result is still likely to be an inflated price that is far higher than the intrinsic value. This is like a 30% discount on the original price of a luxury

item that is already overpriced. Smart buyers will calculate whether the materials, craftsmanship,

and brand premium are really worth the discounted price, rather than being complacent about "taking a 30% discount."

In comparison, although CATL's Hong Kong stock issuance discount was small,

its global leading position and rock-solid performance made it widely recognized by the market that its A-share price is solid and reliable.

It is the best embodiment of intrinsic value, so it can be sought after without a significant discount.

The "discount anchoring" of Cyrus chose the wrong reference system from the beginning,

causing its issue price to change from "concession" to a clear signal of "inflated" in the eyes of institutions.

When the pricing anchor of an IPO has deviated, the market's natural reaction leads to a financial phenomenon-the "winner curse."

This is a very classic phenomenon in IPO research-in the case of information asymmetry,

only investors who are least optimistic about the value of stocks (or least aware of risks) will actively subscribe,

while more knowledgeable institutions will choose to avoid. Only 56% of the international placement was sold,

which is a typical symptom of the "winner's curse." Smart institutions vote with their feet,

indicating that they believe the risks are far greater than the benefits at this price.

The hot subscription of retail investors at 133 times is more driven by the "myth" and marketing sentiment of A-shares.

This kind of funds come and go quickly, and cannot provide stable price support.

When the most knowledgeable institutions exit one after another, and retail investors, mainly driven by emotions,

become the main subscription force, the market has quietly planted the hidden danger of no one supporting the price after listing.

Therefore, the opening price of Sailisi fell below the issue price, and it fell deeply during the trading session, but it became normal instead.

A "discount anchor" based on A-share stock prices that may have bubbles cannot pass the rigorous valuation scrutiny of institutional investors

from the beginning; The resulting "winner's curse" effect has led the most rational funds to collectively exit the market,

giving pricing power to emotionally driven short-term hot money. The combination of these two factors together forms the prelude to a perfect storm,

and the ultimate result is the regretful dark line you see on the candlestick chart.

Valuation logic collapse

If the IPO pricing mistake was the trigger for the cold on the first day of the company, then the complete collapse of its valuation logic

was the underlying factor that triggered the subsequent consecutive declines.

The valuation of a company in the capital market is not fixed. It will undergo fundamental and sometimes cruel "model shifts" as the company's

life cycle evolves.

For Cyrus, it is going through a painful process from a "story-driven" fantasy valuation to a "fundamental-driven" cold reality.

During the startup and concept explosion period of a company, the market follows a "story-driven" valuation method.

At this stage, investors are dream buyers. They don't look at current profits, and even tolerate huge losses.

What they value is the grand narrative about the future that the company tells: Disruptive technology, broad market share, unique ecological niche.

The core investment logic is "trust leads to spirituality"-as long as the market believes that this story has the possibility of realization,

it is willing to pay an astonishing premium for this "possibility". The honeymoon period of the cooperation between Sailis and

Huawei is the biggest beneficiary of this valuation model.

The label "Huawei's only son" is an incredibly sexy capital story, which means top-notch technology empowerment, strong brand endorsement,

and unlimited imagination.

At that stage, the market was willing to temporarily ignore the weakness of Cyrus itself,

tying it to Huawei as a disruptive force that was about to change the industry landscape, and giving it a valuation level comparable to that

of a tech giant.

However, dreams always wake up.

When a company's revenue exceeds 100 billion yuan, when its products have been launched on a large scale,

and when its cooperation model is no longer scarce, the patience of the capital market will be exhausted, and the valuation model will switch.

At this point, the magic of "story-driven" will instantly fail, replaced by rational judgments driven by "fundamentals".

The market demands one thing directly from the company: Real performance.

The core of valuation has shifted from the elusive "imaginative space" to solid hard indicators: Price-to-earnings ratio, discounted free cash flow,

return on equity... Investors have now become strict accountants, and their questions are:

"How much of the vast sea of stars you promised in the past have you fulfilled now?"

The biggest dilemma for Seris is that it is stuck in the fault between these two stages.

Its revenue volume has entered a mature stage that requires "fundamental-driven" trials,

but its performance is still in the early stage of needing "story-driven" to cover up.

This misalignment of identity led to the complete collapse of its valuation system.

The first is the "speed-down": Revenue in the first three quarters of 2025 increased by only 3.7% year-on-year.

For a new force car company that is still highly anticipated, this number is fatal.

It is not a normal pullback in a high-growth cycle, but a clear and unmistakable signal that the company's products may have reached

the market ceiling under the current model, and the story of explosive growth is no longer going on.

Secondly, there is "doubt about the quality of profitability." The net profit in the third quarter fell by 1.7% year-on-year,

and this slight negative sign is like a loud alarm in the eyes of institutional investors.

In the growth stage, when it is supposed to reduce costs and improve profit margins through economies of scale, profits have declined.

Does this imply that the company has encountered difficult problems in cost control, supply chain management, or product gross margins?

When the phenomenon of "increasing revenue but not increasing profits" or even "regressing profits" appears,

it corroborates the expression "extremely difficult to achieve the annual target,"

completely shaking investors' confidence in the company's management's execution and business model's profitability.

Finally, there is the issue of price-to-earnings ratio comparison.

Based on the issue price, the forecast price-to-earnings ratio for Ceres in 2025 is as high as 26.5 times.

This number appears extremely isolated and abrupt in the horizontal comparison.

It is much higher than the average level of traditional Hong Kong car companies by 13.6 times,

which can be explained by the difference between "new and old forces"; However, it is even significantly higher than

the 20.8 times that of BYD, an industry giant that has established a complete industry chain advantage and strong brand power,

and also higher than Ideal Auto, which has achieved stable profitability and is known for its self-developed technology.

At this moment, every rational institutional investor is conducting a simple soul-searching question:

Why don't I choose to buy a BYD or Ideal with a more stable growth rate, deeper technological moat, and higher profit certainty,

and pay a higher premium? How about gambling on a slowing growth, peaking profits, and controlling core technology in the hands of others?

This question has no answer.

Because in a high-order financial valuation model, the value of a company is the discounted value of all its future free cash flows.

When there are cracks in the growth story of Cyrus and the sustainability of profitability is questioned,

the future "cash flow" expectations for it will be significantly lowered. At the same time, due to the huge uncertainty (i.e., increased risk) caused

by the excessive reliance on Huawei cooperation model, the discount rate also needs to be increased accordingly. Between the decline and the rise,

its theoretical "intrinsic value" is like a cliff-like decline.

Institutional investors in the Hong Kong stock market have used this rigorous and cold model to complete the re-pricing of Cyrus.

Over-reliance on partners

From the perspective of enterprise strategy,

Cyrus's problem perfectly confirms the idea of "Coase Theorem" in economics-the boundary of an enterprise is determined by the comparison of

its internal transaction costs and external transaction costs.

The essence of Coase's theorem is that it defines the "boundary of the enterprise."

For a company, what should be done by itself and what should be purchased from the external market,

the criterion for this decision is to compare "internal transaction costs" and "external transaction costs."

In simple terms, if the cost of completing an activity within the company is lower than the cost of negotiating, signing contracts,

and supervising execution in the market, then the company should "internalize" this activity and become its core competence.

Otherwise, it can be outsourced.

The cooperation model between Ceres and Huawei is also similar.

Initially, this path was undoubtedly successful, even at the textbook level.

For Sailis, independently developing intelligent cockpits,

intelligent driving technology, and building a strong brand requires astronomical investment and a long research and development time,

and its "internal transaction costs" are unattainable. Through cooperation with Huawei, it instantly gained top-notch technical solutions,

a shining brand endorsement, and a mature sales network, which greatly "reduces external transaction costs."

This is a shortcut to the market, allowing Ceres to launch competitive products in a short period of time, enjoying enviable early dividends.

However, this shortcut has taken too long, gradually blurring the boundaries of the enterprise itself.

Seris has placed the most core "soul"-intelligent technology, brand image, and user touchpoints-on Huawei.

When the cost of this long-term dependency external cooperation begins to appear and continues to rise,

companies must re-examine their boundaries.

What are these costs? It is the loss of bargaining power, the substantial sharing of profits, the potential risk of technological supply interruption,

and the strategic crisis of muscle atrophy and the loss of independent walking ability.

When these accumulated external costs eventually exceed the internal costs required for independent research and development,

the company falls into the "reliance trap."

Clearly, Cyrus has not yet succeeded in crossing this trap, and it is still in the deep dependency stage.

The negative consequences of this dependence have been magnified at the capital market level.

At the beginning, Sailis was the "only son of Huawei," and this uniqueness itself was the core reason why the capital market

was willing to pay a high premium.

However, when Huawei's smart car selection model came to fruition, Chery, Jianghuai, Changan, and others entered the market one after another.

The "Huawei series" transformed from a carefully crafted "exclusive store" to a dazzling "brand department store".

Sairis, from being the "legitimate son" of many stars, became one of the many "vassals".

The decline in the sales rankings of the QJ series within Huawei is the most ruthless and direct evidence of this position change.

When uniqueness no longer exists, the valuation aura attached to it naturally fades.

More importantly, the capital market has given vastly different valuation coefficients for the two models of "autonomous" and "dependence".

We look at other new energy vehicle companies in the Hong Kong stock market,

whether it is Ideal Auto's deep cultivation in the extended range path and product definition, Xiaopeng's continuous iteration in intelligent driving,

or BYD's full industry chain layout from batteries to electronic control to complete vehicles. They all make it clear to investors:

It has an independent, complete, and closed-loop R&D system and core technology.

This "certainty" is the cornerstone of institutional funds.

They mean that the company can survive and thrive on its own internal strength, regardless of how the external environment of cooperation changes.

On the other hand, the "certainty" of its business model has always been a huge question mark.

Especially for large institutional investors, it is more concerned.

What if Huawei adjusts its cooperation strategy in the future? What if the profit-sharing ratio becomes more stringent?

What if Cyrus is unable to cultivate its own technical recognition?

These uncertainties are translated into higher "risk discount" in the valuation model.

In other words, for every dollar of profit that Cyrus may create in the future, investors believe it is more risky,

so they are willing to buy it at a lower price.

This explains why, at the same level of profitability, the market gives Cyrus a much lower price-to-earnings ratio than its competitors,

which have shown greater autonomy.

Greenshoe mechanism triggering

At this time, the reason for the low opening of the first day of listing and the sharp drop of nearly 10% at one point was roughly clear.

As a market stabilizer, CICC began to enter the market according to the rules,

using "greenshoe funds" to buy stocks in an attempt to bring the stock price back above the issue price.

Good news? Maybe.

But for more investors, it's time to mention the observation.

The "greenshoe mechanism" is not a proof of a company's value, but a pre-set procedure that essentially provides an "insurance" for the issuer,

allowing underwriters to buy in when the stock price breaks to stabilize the price.

Its launch already indicates that without external intervention, this stock cannot even hold its basic issue price.

China International Capital Corporation's purchase of 2.2369 million shares is to fulfill its responsibility as a market stabilizer,

but this part of the purchase is passive and planned, rather than an active investment based on value judgment.

This artificial support can only be maintained for a while. Once the protection funds are used up,

the stock price will eventually return to its proper level. The next day, the stock price of Sailisi continued to fall and officially broke,

which is the best proof.

The Hong Kong stock market is a rational market where "no rabbits, no eagles."

It is no longer paying a high premium for simple "Chinese stories" or "ecological concepts."

When companies move from the "storytelling" stage to the "report card" stage, any slowdown in growth, fluctuations in profits,

and flaws in models will be mercilessly amplified and priced by this highly effective market.

For Cyrus, the only way to stabilize the stock price in the short term is to deliver fourth-quarter results that far exceed market expectations,

but this is extremely difficult.

In the long run, I think its way out is nothing more than a few directions:

First, reshape the valuation logic: Clearly demonstrate to the market its independent core technology roadmap

and timetable for de-Huawei (or at least reducing dependence).

Second, demonstrate the quality of profitability: It is not only necessary to restore profit growth,

but also to demonstrate an increase in gross margins that do not rely on short-term subsidies and marketing,

and stem from the strong competitiveness of the products themselves.

Third, explore the second growth curve:

Breaking away from the absolute dependence on the Wenjie series proves its platform-based capabilities and

the strength of incubating new popular models.

Shortcuts can allow you to take off quickly, but to continue to soar, you must have your own strong wings.

The capital market is cruel, and it ultimately believes in companies that hold their destiny firmly in their own hands.

The only way to restore market confidence is to prove to the world that it has the ability and determination to expand

its corporate boundaries to the core area that supports its independent value.

Otherwise, the "black opening" on the first day of listing may only be the starting point of its capital market value return.

This article is from the WeChat public account "Dongzhen Shanglue", author: Dongzhen Business Strategy, released with authorization

from 36Kr.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and the 36Kr platform only provides information storage space services.

赛力斯为何突然暴跌？

东针商略·2025年11月07日 10:13

对于赛力斯而言，重塑市场信心的**途径，便是向世界证明，它有能力、也有决心，将自己的企业边界，扩张到能够支撑其独立价值的核心地带。

2025年11月5日，赛力斯汽车以“国内首家A+H豪华新能源车企”的身份登陆香港股市，募资140亿港元，成为今年全球车企在港股的**IPO。

然而上市首日即遭遇“开门黑”。

股价低开低走，一度大跌近10%，市值蒸发超200亿港元。

尽管承销商动用“绿鞋资金”护盘，勉强守住发行价，但次日股价继续下跌，正式跌破发行价。

A股市场同样受到拖累，两天累计市值缩水约67亿元。

尽管港股发行价较A股折价逾22%，但机构投资者仍不看好。原计划发售的股票仅卖出一半多，显示大资金态度谨慎。

与之形成鲜明对比的是，散户认购火爆，超购133倍，冻结资金超1700亿港元。但市场认为这更多是短线炒作，难以持续支撑股价。

赛力斯的锚错了

赛力斯的“开门黑”，是 “市场有效性理论” 在港股这个成熟机构市场中的一次体现。其核心矛盾在于：公司基于过去“故事”的估值预期，

与机构投资者基于未来“风险折现”的估值模型之间，发生了不可调和的冲突。

要知道，IPO的发行价不是随意定的，它需要一个“锚”来获得市场的认可。

任何公司上市，都需要为它的股票定一个价格，这个价格不能是空中楼阁，它必须找到一个能让市场信服的“锚点”。

对于像赛力斯这样已经在A股上市的公司，最直接、最看似合理的锚点，就是它在A股的实时股价。

逻辑很简单：我们在A股已经有一个被市场交易出来的价格了，港股发行价就以此为基准，给予一个“友情折扣”，这难道不是给港股投资者的让利吗？

然误区恰恰就隐藏在这里。

赛力斯的承销商给出了相较于A股收盘价22.7%的折扣，这个幅度看似已远超同行，但他们错误地判断了市场的评判逻辑。

专业的机构投资者，尤其是港股市场上那些久经沙场的国际基金，他们根本不在乎“你比A股便宜了多少”，他们只关心一个问题：“你比你的内在价值贵了多少？”

这里的“内在价值”，是一个基于公司未来所有现金流折现、盈利能力、增长潜力和风险评估的计算结果。

问题在于，赛力斯A股的股价本身，可能就是一个在流动性、散户热情和“华为概念”多重加持下被吹起的泡沫。

用一个可能存在泡沫的价格作为基准，再打一个折扣，得到的依然可能是一个远高于内在价值的虚高价格。

这就如同在一件本就标价过高的奢侈品原价上打七折，精明买家会计算的是它的材料、工艺和品牌溢价是否真的值这个折后价，

而不是为“占了三折便宜”而沾沾自喜。

相比之下，宁德时代当年港股发行折扣虽小，但其全球龙头地位和坚如磐石的业绩，让市场普遍认可其A股价格是坚实可靠的，

其本身就是内在价值的**体现，因此无需大幅折让也能获得追捧。

赛力斯的“折扣锚定”，从一开始就选错了参照系，导致其发行价在机构眼中，从“让利”变成了“虚高”的明确信号。

当IPO的定价之锚已经偏离，市场的自然反应便会引出一个金融现象——“赢家诅咒”。

这是一个在IPO研究中非常经典的现象——在信息不对称的情况下，只有那些对股票价值最不乐观（或者说最不了解风险）的投资者才会踊跃认购，

而更懂行的机构会选择回避。赛力斯此次国际配售部分仅售出56%，就是“赢家诅咒”的典型症状。聪明的机构用脚投票，表明他们认为在这个价格上，

风险远大于收益。而散户133倍的火爆认购，更多是受A股“神话”和营销情绪的驱动，这种资金来得快，去得也快，无法提供稳定的价格支撑。

当最懂行的机构纷纷退场，而主要由情绪驱动的散户成为认购主力时，市场就已经悄然埋下了上市后价格无人托底的隐患。

所以，赛力斯开盘即跌破发行价，盘中一度深跌，反而变得正常了。

一个基于可能存有泡沫的A股股价而定的“折扣锚”，从一开始就无法通过机构投资者苛刻的估值审视；

随之而来的“赢家诅咒”效应，则让最理性的资金集体退场，将定价权交给了情绪驱动的短期热钱。

这两个因素的叠加，共同构成了一场完美风暴的前奏，其最终的结果，便是您在K线图上看到的那根令人扼腕的阴线。

估值逻辑崩塌

如果说IPO定价的失误是赛力斯首日遇冷的导火索，那么其估值逻辑的彻底崩塌，才是引发后续连环下跌的深层因素。

资本市场对一家公司的估值，并非一成不变的。它会随着公司生命周期的演进，发生根本性的、有时甚至是残酷的“模式转换”。

对于赛力斯而言，它正经历着从“故事驱动”的梦幻估值，跌落到“基本面驱动”的冰冷现实这一痛苦过程。

在公司的初创与概念爆发期，市场奉行的是“故事驱动”估值法。

这个阶段，投资者是梦想的买单者。他们不看当下的盈利，甚至宽容巨额的亏损，他们看重的是公司所讲述的关于未来的宏大叙事：

颠覆性的技术、广阔的市场份额、独特的生态位。

核心投资逻辑是“信则灵”——只要市场相信这个故事有实现的可能，就愿意为这份“可能性”支付惊人的溢价。

赛力斯与华为合作的蜜月期，正是这一估值模式的**受益者。

“华为**亲儿子”这个标签，是一个无比性感的资本故事，它意味着**的技术赋能、强大的品牌背书和无限的想象空间。

在那个阶段，市场愿意暂时忽略赛力斯自身的羸弱，将它与华为捆绑，视为一个即将改变行业格局的颠覆性力量，并给予了它堪比科技巨头的估值水平。

然而，梦总是要醒的。

当一家公司的营收规模突破千亿，当它的产品已经大规模推向市场，当它的合作模式不再具备稀缺性时，资本市场的耐心就会耗尽，估值模式便会发生切换。

这时，“故事驱动”的魔法会瞬间失效，取而代之的是“基本面驱动”的理性判断。

市场会直接向公司索要一样东西：实实在在的业绩。

估值核心从飘渺的“想象空间”转向了坚实的硬指标：市盈率、自由现金流折现、净资产收益率……投资者此刻变成了严厉的会计师，

他们的问题是：“你过去承诺的星辰大海，现在究竟兑现了多少？”

而赛力斯**的困境，恰恰在于它卡在了这两个阶段的断层之中。

它的营收体量已经进入了需要接受“基本面驱动”审判的成熟期，但它的业绩表现，却依然停留在需要“故事驱动”来遮羞的初级阶段。

这种身份认同的错位，导致了其估值体系的全面崩溃。

首先是“增速失速”：2025年前三季度营收同比仅增长3.7%。对于一个仍被寄予厚望的新势力车企而言，这个数字是致命的。

它不是一个高增长周期中的正常回调，而是一个明确无误的见顶信号，这公司的产品或许已经触及了当前模式下的市场天花板，爆发式增长的故事已经讲不下去了。

其次，是“盈利质量存疑”。第三季度净利润同比下降1.7%，这个细微的负号，在机构投资者眼中不啻于一记响亮的警报。

在理应通过规模效应降低成本、提升利润率的成长阶段，利润反而出现下滑，这会不会暗示了公司在成本控制、供应链管理或者产品毛利率上出现了棘手的问题？

当“增收不增利”甚至“利润倒退”的现象出现时，它与“完成全年目标难度极大”的表述相互印证，

彻底动摇了投资者对于公司管理层执行力和商业模式盈利能力的信心。

最后，是市盈率比较的问题。

按发行价计算，赛力斯2025年的预测市盈率高达26.5倍。这个数字，在横向对比中显得无比孤立和突兀。

它远高于港股传统车企13.6倍的平均水平，这尚且可以用“新旧势力”之别来解释；

但它甚至显著高于已经建立起全产业链优势、品牌力强大的行业巨头比亚迪的20.8倍，也高于已实现稳定盈利、以技术自研著称的理想汽车。

此刻，每一位理性的机构投资者都在进行一个简单的灵魂拷问：我为什么不选择去买一个增速更稳健、技术护城河更深、盈利确定性更高的比亚迪或理想，

而要付出更高的溢价，去赌一个增速放缓、盈利见顶、核心技术命脉掌握在别人手中的赛力斯呢？

这个拷问，没有答案。

因为在高阶的金融估值模型中，一家公司的价值，是其未来所有自由现金流的折现值。

当赛力斯的增长故事出现裂痕，盈利能力的可持续性被打上问号，那么它未来所能产生的“现金流”预期就会被大幅下调。

同时，由于其过度依赖华为的合作模式带来了巨大的不确定性（即风险增高），折现率也要相应提高。一降一升之间，其理论上的“内在价值”便如断崖式下跌。

港股市场上的机构投资者，正是用这套严谨而冷酷的模型，完成了对赛力斯的重新定价。

过度依赖合作方

从企业战略角度看，赛力斯的问题完美印证了经济学中的“科斯定理”思想——企业的边界由其内部交易成本与外部交易成本的对比决定。

科斯定理的精髓在于，它定义了“企业的边界”。

一个公司，什么事应该自己做，什么事应该从外部市场购买，这个决策的准绳，在于比较“内部交易成本”和“外部交易成本”。

简单来说，如果一项活动在公司内部完成的成本，低于在市场上与别人谈判、签约、监督执行的成本，那么这家公司就应该将这项活动“内部化”，

变成自己的核心能力。

反之，则可以外包。

赛力斯与华为的合作模式也雷同。

初期，这条路径无疑是成功的，甚至是教科书级别的。

对于赛力斯而言，自主研发智能座舱、智能驾驶技术，并构建一个强大的品牌，需要投入天文数字的资金和漫长的研发时间，其“内部交易成本”高不可攀。

而通过与华为合作，它瞬间获得了顶尖的技术解决方案、金光闪闪的品牌背书和成熟的销售网络，这极大地“降低了外部交易成本”。

这是一条通往市场的捷径，让赛力斯得以在短时间内推出有竞争力的产品，享受了令人艳羡的早期红利。

但这条捷径走得太久，逐渐模糊了企业自身的边界。

赛力斯将最核心的“灵魂”——智能技术、品牌形象、用户触点，都寄托在了华为身上。

根据科斯定理的长期逻辑，当这种“长期依赖外部合作”的成本开始显现并持续攀升时，企业就必须重新审视自己的边界。

这些成本是什么？是议价权的丧失，是利润的大幅分成，是潜在的技术断供风险，更是自身肌肉萎缩、丧失独立行走能力的战略危机。

当这些不断累积的外部成本，最终超过了咬牙自主研发所需的内部成本时，企业就陷入了“依赖陷阱”。

显然，赛力斯至今仍未成功跨越这个陷阱，它依然处于深度依赖阶段。

这种依赖的恶果，在资本市场层面被加倍放大。

一开始，赛力斯是“华为**亲儿子”，这种独特性本身，就是资本市场愿意支付高溢价的核心理由。

然而，当华为的智选车模式开花结果，奇瑞、江淮、长安等纷纷入局，“华为系”从精心打造的“**专卖店”，变成了琳琅满目的“品牌百货”。

赛力斯从众星捧月的“嫡子”，沦为了众多“诸侯”之一。

问界系列在华为内部销售排名的下滑，就是这一地位变迁最无情、最直观的证据。

当独特性不复存在，依附于其上的估值光环自然随之黯淡。

更重要的是，资本市场对于“自主”与“依赖”这两种模式，给予了天差地别的估值系数。

我们环视港股市场上的其他新能源车企，无论是理想汽车在增程路径和产品定义上的深耕，小鹏在智能驾驶上的持续迭代，

还是比亚迪从电池到电控再到整车的全产业链布局，它们都向投资者清晰地证明了一点：拥有独立的、完整的、可闭环的研发体系和核心技术。

这种“确定性”，是机构资金的压舱石。

它们意味着，无论外部合作环境如何变化，这家公司都能依靠自身的内生力量活下去，并且发展下去。

反观赛力斯，其商业模式的“确定性”始终被打上一个巨大的问号。

尤其对于大型的机构投资者而言，更为担忧。

如果未来华为调整合作策略怎么办？如果利润分成比例变得更加苛刻怎么办？如果赛力斯始终无法培育出属于自己的技术识别度怎么办？

这些不确定性，在估值模型中被转化为更高的“风险折价”。

也就是说，对于赛力斯未来可能创造的每一块钱利润，投资者都认为它风险更高，因此只愿意用更低的价格来购买。

这就解释了为何在同样的盈利水平下，市场给予赛力斯的市盈率，远低于那些展现了更强自主性的竞争对手。

绿鞋机制触发

而这时，赛力斯上市首日股价低开、一度暴跌近10%的原由，大致上就清楚了。

作为稳市商的中金公司便按照规则开始入场，动用“绿鞋资金”买入股票，试图把股价拉回到发行价上方。

好消息吗？或许是的。

但对于更多投资者而言，恰好要提起心肝观察了。

“绿鞋机制”不是看好公司价值的证明，而是事先设定好的程序，本质上是给发行人的一个“保险”，允许承销商在股价破发时买入以稳定价格。

它的启动本来就说明了，如果没有外力干预，这只股票连最基本的发行价都守不住。

中金公司买入223.69万股，是履行其作为稳市商的责任，但这部分买入是被动的、有计划的，而非基于价值判断的主动投资。

这种人为支撑只能维持一时，一旦护盘资金用完，股价终将回归它应有的水平。第二天赛力斯股价继续下跌、正式破发，就是**的证明。

港股市场，是一个“不见兔子不撒鹰”的理性市场。它不再为单纯的“中国故事”或“生态概念”支付过高溢价。

当企业从“讲故事”阶段迈向“交成绩单”阶段时，任何增速的放缓、盈利的波动、模式的瑕疵，都会被这个高度有效的市场无情放大和定价。

对于赛力斯而言，短期稳住股价的**方法是交出远超市场预期的第四季度业绩，但这难度极大。

长期来看，我认为它的出路不外乎几个方向：

**，重塑估值逻辑：向市场清晰地展示其去华为化（或至少是降低依赖度）的自主核心技术路线图和时间表。

第二，证明盈利质量：不仅要恢复利润增长，更要展示出不依赖短期补贴和营销、源自产品本身强大竞争力的毛利率提升。

第三，开拓第二增长曲线：摆脱对问界系列的绝对依赖，证明其平台化能力和孵化新爆款车型的实力。

捷径可以让你快速起飞，但若要持续翱翔，你必须拥有属于自己的、强健的翅膀。

资本市场是残忍的，它最终信仰的，是那些将命运牢牢掌握在自己手中的企业。

对于赛力斯而言，重塑市场信心的**途径，便是向世界证明，它有能力、也有决心，将自己的企业边界，扩张到能够支撑其独立价值的核心地带。

否则，这次上市首日的“开门黑”，可能只是其资本市场价值回归之路的起点。

本文来自微信公众号“东针商略”，作者：东针商略，36氪经授权发布。

该文观点仅代表作者本人，36氪平台仅提供信息存储空间服务。